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The oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria has for many years been the site of 
environmental degradation, violence, vandalism, and chaos. The exploration 
and extraction of oil mineral resources is at the root of this problem. 
Conflicts between the region‟s residents and the Federal Government of 
Nigeria started as soon as the oil multinationals began setting up their 
operations. Over time, the people have had successive federal and state 
governments disregard their needs. Environmental degradation, pollution 
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from oil spills and gas flares not only destroy the people‟s lands and 
livelihood, they shorten life expectancy. These resulted in local unrest and 
gradually deteriorated into armed struggle, obstructing local and national 
socio-economic development. By 1998, the region had become a “lawless 
zone”, where youths disrupted oil production activities, engaged in 
kidnapping and hostage talking, and communities frequently engaged with 
little provocation in destructive inter- and intra- community strife. Successive 
administrations have employed several strategies to resolve and manage the 
crisis in the region without success. The Amnesty Programme introduced in 
2009 by Late President Yar‟Adua is one of such strategies. This study seeks 
to examine the inadequacies and short-comings of the Amnesty Programme 
as a crisis management strategy in the Niger Delta. 
Introduction 
Oil mineral exploration and extraction lie at the heart of the Delta region‘s 
problem. Over 50 years of oil exploration and exploitation has occasioned 
environmental degradation and pollution, resulting in excruciating and 
brutalizing poverty, unemployment, diseases and health hazards and even 
death among the people living in the region (TELL Magazine, February 18, 
2008). According to Azigbo (2008: 18), the major culprits in these ugly 
incidents are the multinational oil corporations. From one community to 
another, vast acres of farmlands are devastated by oil spills; aquatic lives are 
destroyed and the very existence of the people is threatened by the toxic 
effects of gas flares in addition to the cumulative effects of all disasters. 
Thus, threatened by decades of operations of the multinational oil companies 
and abandoned by successive governments at the centre, which has resulted 
in high level of socio-economic underdevelopment (manifesting in the 
absence of infrastructural facilities and poor standards of living, the region 
became enveloped by a feeling of abandonment, denial and frustration. 
Consequently, there has been since the 1990s, the emergence of resistant 
organizations from various ethnic nationalities in the Niger Delta to confront 
the multinational oil corporations and the Nigerian state. The restiveness 
which started on a mild note as pockets of peaceful demonstrations to the 
offices of the multinational oil companies by community development 
committees of various host communities has since degenerated into a state of 
militancy, hostage-taking, destruction of oil installations, disruption of socio-
economic activities and unparalleled violence, thus, turning the region into a 
hot spot. 
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The restive youths and the militants were becoming more daring and were 
only short of declaring full scare war on the region and the operators of the 
oil and gas industry when in June, 2009; late President Shehu Musa 
Yar‘Adua unveiled his amnesty plan for militants in the region. Those 
willing to take part were offered presidential pardon, participation in a 
rehabilitation programme, and education and training in exchange for turning 
over their weapons. But the extent to which the Amnesty Programme, as a 
crises management strategy, has been effective in handling the Niger Delta 
crisis is debatable. This paper is part of the debate. It argues that the Amnesty 
Programme like other intervention measures by government has not 
addressed the fundamental issues that gave rise to the state of affairs in the 
Niger Delta region. 
Structurally, the paper is divided into three main parts. Part one examines the 
nature and character of the Niger Delta crisis while part two is concerned 
with the short comings and inadequacies of the crisis management strategies 
adopted by government in the Niger Delta region with particular focus on the 
Amnesty Programme. Finally, the third part which is the conclusion makes 
far reaching recommendations on the way forward. 
The nature and character of the Niger Delta crisis 
The long years of neglect and deprivation, coupled with insensitivity of 
successive governments and the oil companies, had by the late 1990s created 
a volatile atmosphere characterized by protests, agitations and conflicts. 
According to Azigbo (2008:18), the restiveness which started on a mild not 
as pockets of peaceful demonstrations to the offices of multinational oil 
companies by community development committees of various host 
communities, soon degenerated into lock-ins and seizures of oil installations. 
By 1998, the Niger Delta region had become ―a lawless zone, where youths 
disrupted oil production activities and communities frequently engaged with 
little provocation, in destructive inter-and intra-community strife‖ (NDDC, 
2004). 
The crises in the Niger Delta manifests in various ways namely, militancy, 
hostage taking and kidnapping of oil workers and frequent disruption of oil 
production activities through the destruction of oil and gas installations and 
facilities. 
Prominent among the militant groups operating in the region are the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry 
Okah, the Niger Delta People‘s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji 
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Asari Dokubo, the Niger Delta Vigilante force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom, 
the Bush Boys, the Martyrs Brigade among others. These militant groups 
have carried out deadly and paralyzing attacks on oil and gas facilities with 
their weapons. For instance, on March 16, 2003, Shell Petroleum 
Development Corporation (SPDC), Nigeria‘s biggest oil producing company, 
evacuated non-essential staff from its facilities in Warri, Delta State, and shut 
down oil production, following a mouth of mounting unrest by ethnic Ijaw 
militant groups that culminated in an attack on the Nigerian Navy on the 
Escravos River that left seven people dead, several soldiers wounded, and 
significantly disrupted riverine travel. Subsequently attacks by militants 
killed one Chevron contract worker and five TotalFinalElf (IFE) personnel, 
while gunfire badly damaged a shell helicopter seeking to evacuate 
employees (Cesarz, Morrison and Cooke, 2003:1). On July 12, 2006, the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) combatants 
killed four naval personnel and injured three soldiers who were escorting a 
Chevron oil tanker along Chomoni creeks in the Warri South West Local 
Government Area of Delta State (The Punch, July 13, 2006). On the eve of 
the Governorship and House of Assembly elections on April 14, 2007, armed 
militants attacked the Mini-Okoro, Elelenwo Police Stations, killing many 
police officers during the attack (The Midweek Telegraph, April 18 – 24, 
2007). On Tuesday, January 1, 2008, the Niger Delta Vigilante Force 
(NDVF) led by Ateke Tom attacked two Police Stations and a five star hotel 
in Port Harcourt. The list of attacks is long and seemingly endless; the latest 
being the bomb blast on Eagle Square in Abuja on October 1, 2010 caused by 
MEND. 
Hostage taking and kidnapping are other operational activities of militant 
groups in the region. A recent statistics released by Niger Delta Development 
Monitoring and Corporate Watch (NIDDEMCOW), a non-governmental 
organization, shows that between 1999 and 2007, a total of 308 hostage 
taking incidents occurred in the region (see the Tide, Tuesday, July 10, 
2007). A breakdown of this record shows that Bayelsa State was on the lead 
with 131 incidents. Rivers State had 113; Delta State 45, while Akwa Ibom 
had the least record of 15. The record further shows that in 2003, 18 oil 
workers were taken hostage in Bayelsa, in 2004, 5 hostages, 39 in 2006 while 
between January and June, 2007 69 people were taken hostage, out of which 
50 were soldiers. Within the period under review, Rivers State recorded 2 
incidents in 1999, one in 2005, 55 in 2006 and 60 as at June, 2007, with 26 
soldiers, 1 woman and a three year-old child involved. Unfortunately, the 
Vol. 6 (2) Serial No. 25, April, 2012. Pp. 162-170 
 
Copyright © IAARR 2012: www.afrrevjo.net 166 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
situation has since then deteriorated and the spate of militancy, hostage 
taking and kidnapping incidents have increased in scope and tempo covering 
virtually all the oil producing states of Nigeria. 
The dexterity with which the militants operate coupled with the sophisticated 
nature of their weapons have defiled all curbing  measures and raised 
questions such as the source of the militants‘ weapons and where and how 
they receive the military experience and training. 
Be that as it may, the issue at stake in all cases is the demand by the armed 
militant groups for greater autonomy and control of the oil resources in the 
Niger Delta region, equitable distribution of the benefits of oil mineral 
exploitation, justice and the development of the region though some analysts 
have asserted that militancy in the region has assumed some criminal 
dimension rather than the legitimate struggle for the emancipation of the 
region. 
The poverty of crisis management strategies in the Niger Delta 
Successive governments have over the years recognized the fact that the 
crisis in the Niger Delta does pose a threat to the security, unity and territorial 
integrity of the Nigerian state, the lives and property of the residents of the 
region and the booming petro-business which has direct link or bearing with 
the national economy. Thus, various approaches have been adopted by 
government to curb the crisis. Yet, the crisis remains unabated. This is 
because all these approaches have failed to address the fundamental issues at 
stake in the regions‘ crisis, namely, environmental degradation, consequent 
upon oil exploration activities, issues of fiscal federalism, minority rights, 
resource control and allocations. 
When Isaac Adaka Boro formed his Niger Delta Volunteer Force, an armed 
group (consisting mainly the people of Ijaw ethnic origin) with which he 
declared the Niger Delta Republic on February 23, 1966, in protest for the 
exploitation of oil resources in the Niger Delta which benefited mainly the 
Federal authorities, he was routed by the federal military institution and 
jailed with his compatriots for treasonable felony. Boro‘s argument was that 
the people of the region deserved a better deal from the Federal authorities 
for the degradation of their environment and the devastation of their economy 
by oil multinationals. 
In 1995, about thirty years after, the Federal Governemnt under the late 
General Sanni Abacha struck again, this time killing Kenule Beeson Saro – 
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Wiwa (a renowned writer and environmental right activist) and his eight 
compatriots for demanding that Ogoni people be compensated adequately by 
Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) for environmental 
devastation and economic sabourtage. 
On November 20, 1999, the government of President Obasanjo deployed 
military troops to Odi, a predominantly Ijaw town in Bayelsa State. The 
Nigerian military carried out an attack on a civilian village killing men, 
women and children. Whatever the explanations from the federal authorities 
for the Odi massacre, the truth is that the attack by the military was within 
the context of an ongoing conflict in the Niger Delta over indigenous rights 
to oil resources and environmental protection (Duru, 2010). 
Whether in the case of Boro, Saro – Wiwa or the Odi massacre, the 
imprisonment and killing of the people did not in anywhere address the 
fundamental issues at stake in the crisis. For instance, while the people were 
being killed for demanding a better deal from both the oil multinationals and 
the federal authorities for environmental devastation, ―the major culprits in 
the crisis‖, the oil multinationals, were left by the Federal Government to 
continue with the devastation of the environment and the people‘s means of 
livelihood. 
Apart from this military option, government has at some other times 
employed a developmental approach to solving the problem. Thus, various 
development intervention agencies such as the Niger Delta Development 
Board, River Basin Development Authority, Oil Mineral Producing Area 
Development Commission and recently, the Niger Delta Development 
Commission set up in 2001 by the Obasanjo administration have existed at 
one time or the other. The aim has been to use these agencies for the 
development of the region. But the question remains; how does the Nigerian 
state and   those who act on its behalf define development and 
underdevelopment? What to them constitutes development and 
underdevelopment? Understanding these issues will help in properly 
appraising the roles and operations of  
these development intervention agencies in the region and why they have 
failed over the years to bail the region out of its persistent and endemic socio-
economic, infrastructural and environmental crisis (Assibong, 2004). 
Be that as it may, while the development intervention agencies were to 
ensure the socio-economic and infrastructural development of the Niger 
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Delta, none of them tackled the problem of environmental pollution in the 
area, nor did the Federal Government sanction or suspend the operators of the 
multinational oil corporations for their non-environmental friendly practices 
in the region. 
It, therefore, becomes obvious that the Nigerian state and those who act on its 
behalf have either not acknowledged, or have deliberately and criminally 
refused to acknowledge that the root cause of the crisis in the Niger Delta is 
oil extraction, and that the excesses and insensitivity of the operators of the 
oil multinationals are largely contributing to the fuelling of this crisis. Thus, 
any development policy in the Niger Delta that fails to address wholly these 
issues, amounts to an excess in futility and a waste of public resources. 
In June, 2009, the Late President Umaru Musa Yar‘Adua unveiled an 
Amnesty Programme for militants in the region. The central objective of the 
Programme is that the Federal Government will grant amnesty to any militant 
willing to come out of the regions‘ million-square-mile network of oil-ladden 
creeks and swamps, turn in his weapon and accept a US$13 daily stipend in 
exchange. It is estimated that between 10,000 to 25,000 militants surrendered 
their weapons at the end of the Amnesty Programme which lasted from 
August to October, 2009 and the payment will run for an open-ended amount 
of time from about US$63 million budget by the government (New York 
Times, October 4, 2009). Apart from the daily payments for accepting the 
amnesty offer and surrendering their weapons, the militants are to undergo 
retraining and re-orientation programme to prepare them for full integration 
into the larger society. 
While it must be acknowledged that the Amnesty Programme remains one of 
the most realistic efforts by any government in Nigeria to address and ease 
the unrest in the Niger Delta region, the Programme has come under 
criticisms for not seeking permanent solutions to the region‘s underlying 
problems. While some have criticized the Programme for doing ―little to 
address the core causes of militancy and criminality that have plagued the 
Niger Delta for decades, such as lack of education, jobs and basic services‖ 
(Connors and Swartz, 2009), others question the viability of the Amnesty 
Programme as a crisis management strategy when the conditions and terms of 
the amnesty were decided by the government without consulting the militant 
groups (BBC News; Thursday, 6 August, 2009). In an editorial entitled; 
―Amnesty: Is this the end of Militancy?‖ the Vanguard Newspapers of 
Tuesday, October 13, 2009 asserts that ―government has refused to address 
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the root cause of the militancy. Why did Isaac Boro rebel? Why was Ken 
Saro – Wiwa hung? Except these questions are answered and fundamental 
issues addressed, amnesty will be a mere ruse, an exercise in futility‖. While 
the Amnesty Programme is in progress, the environmental and ecological 
devastation of the Niger Delta region by the oil multinationals remain 
unabated and unresolved. 
As the Vanguard Newspaper had projected, one year after the Amnesty 
Programme, the militancy in the Niger Delta has not abated. Rather, it has 
escalated to other parts of the country with the militant groups sustaining and 
carrying out devastating attacks on strategic places in Nigeria as was 
witnessed in the horrors of October 1, 2010 bomb blast at the Eagle Square in 
Abuja by MEND. 
Concluding remarks 
The crisis in the Niger Delta region highlights more profound national 
challenges with which Nigeria will have to contend. Most notably are the 
issues of fiscal federalism, minority rights, resource control and allocations 
and poverty alleviation (Ogbonnaya, 2011).  
Consequently, unless the composition of the Nigerian state is altered 
significantly along with vested interests, mere government policies like the 
Amnesty Programme cannot produce the desired result. To bring about this, 
the incumbent ruling class must abdicate together with their entrenched 
economic interests. Such an abdication would have an immediate impact on 
the character and form of government and also provide a new economic 
direction. This implicitly calls for the dissolution of the existing regime of 
economic ownership by a few. This leads us to an agreement with the 
assertion that if we cannot change the ruling class and its corresponding 
economic ideology in Nigeria, we better forget about the end to the crisis in 
the Niger Delta (Ekanem, 1997:82). 
It is our submission here that one major way to ensuring this change is the 
proper implementation of true fiscal federalism in Nigeria. Obviously, this 
would guarantee a lasting solution to the militancy and crisis of 
underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. 
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